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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DONALD FLYNN,  




DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; KATHY MCCARTY, Medical Director at SCI 
Coal Township; MEDICAL STAFF – ALL; SUPERINTENDENT COAL TOWNSHIP 
SCI; THOMAS WILLIAMS, Unit Manager; CHARLES STETLER, Security Captain; 
CO M.J. LAHR; SHIPE, Security Lieutenant; SECURITY LT. R.E. LONG; 
CO NOWELL; TERESE JELLEN, Mailroom Inspector; ALL MAIL INSPECTORS; 
MICHAEL CORBACIO, CAM II, PRC; CHARLES CUSTER, Unit Manager, PRC; 
JOHN SIDLER, LPM, PRC; RICHARDS, Correction Officer, PRC;  
CAPTAIN SCICCHATANO; MAJOR MICHAEL MILLER; ROBIN M. LEWIS, Chief 
Hearing Examiner; LS KERNS-BARR, Hearing Examiner at SCI-Muncy;  
RHONDA ELLETT, Deputy Superintendent at SCI-Waymart; and  
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 3:12-cv-01535) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 25, 2017 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 













 Donald Flynn appeals a judgment against him entered by the District Court in this 
pro se civil rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment in part, 
vacate it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I.  
 Flynn is an inmate at SCI-Coal Township in Pennsylvania. He filed this suit under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming injuries from multiple episodes of allegedly unconstitutional 
conduct at the prison. Pertinent to this appeal, Flynn accused various prison officials of 
retaliating against him for filing grievances that challenged changes in policy for inmate 
phone calls. The retaliation came in many forms, including placement in restricted 
housing, misconduct charges, and confiscation of “legal materials.” Flynn separately 
claimed that he was placed in a “P.O.C. dry cell” for days with no water, clothes, or 
proper medical care.1 For some of that time, Flynn languished in his own vomit.2 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 The District Court observed that “P.O.C.” presumably referred to the prison’s 
“Psychiatric Observation Cell.” Before coming to court, Flynn addressed the “P.O.C. dry 
cell” issues with the prison in Grievance No. 386960. 
 
2 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Moreover, insofar as the District Court 
dismissed certain of Flynn’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), we accept as true all 
well-pleaded factual allegations. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 
2008). And insofar as the District Court granted summary judgment, we review the 
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 Flynn’s claims were progressively dismissed by the District Court in response to 
dispositive motions filed by the 20 defendants identified by name in the caption to 
Flynn’s complaint (“Defendants”). The largest cohort of Defendants was granted 
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by order entered August 26, 2013. The 
dismissals were with prejudice; the District Court did not offer Flynn leave to amend.   
The Defendants left in the case (Jellen, Long, Nowell, Shipe, Stetler, and Varano; 
collectively, “Remaining Defendants”) were partially successful with a December 2013 
motion for summary judgment, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The District Court concluded, 
among other of its rulings, that Flynn’s failure “to comply with grievance system 
procedural rules . . . resulted in the rejection of his final administrative appeal” of 
Grievance No. 386960 (in which Flynn challenged his treatment in the P.O.C. dry cell), 
and that this failure supported “a finding of non-exhaustion and entry of summary 
judgment” on the P.O.C. dry cell claims against Captain Stetler and Lieutenant Shipe 
(both prison security officials). The District Court’s order on Remaining Defendants’ 
motion, entered February 3, 2015, allowed only two claims to survive.  
By then, discovery had long been closed and the time for filing any more pretrial 
motions had expired.3 But the District Court did not make preparations for trial. Instead, 
                                                                                                                                                  
relevant evidence of record in the light most favorable to Flynn. Miller v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 844 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
3 According to the District Court’s standing order for pro se litigation, where, as in this 
case, no scheduling order is entered, the parties have six months from the last-filed 
pleading in which to conduct discovery. Pretrial motions are due no later than 30 days 
after the close of discovery. It appears from the District Court’s docket that the last-filed 
pleading was Remaining Defendants’ August 28, 2013 answer.    
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it invited “additional dispositive motions.” Remaining Defendants4 proceeded to file a 
second motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the District Court on March 
4, 2016. Judgment in favor of all Defendants and against Flynn was entered that day. 
Flynn timely appealed.5 
II. 
 Flynn was free to present for our consideration any appellate issues he saw fit. But 
we asked that he and Defendants make sure to brief at least the following three: 
(1) Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it did not 
permit Flynn, either in response to the Defendants’ motion for 
dismissal of fewer than all claims or in the Order granting that 
motion with prejudice, an opportunity to file an amended pleading; 
 
(2) Whether the District Court erred in determining that there existed 
no genuine dispute, and granting summary judgment as a result, on 
the issue of Flynn’s exhaustion of available institutional remedies 
with respect to Grievance No. 386960; and 
 
(3) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in permitting 
defendants Stetler, Shipe, Long, Nowell, and Varano to file a second 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
See Flynn v. Dep’t of Corr., CA No. 16-1841 (order entered on Nov. 3, 2016) (internal 
citations omitted).6  
III. 
                                              
 
4 Minus defendant Jellen, as the claims against her were all dismissed by virtue of the 
District Court’s February 3, 2015 order. 
 
5 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
6 In addition to advocating for affirmative answers to the above issues, Flynn’s opening 
brief argues that the District Court erred in a number of other ways. We find none of 
those arguments persuasive, and do not discuss them further in the body of this opinion.  
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 After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, we have 
determined that two issues require remand to the District Court for further proceedings. 
First, we hold that the District Court erred when it failed to permit Flynn an opportunity 
to amend before granting Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(6) on August 26, 2013, 
and dismissing a substantial portion of the complaint with prejudice. This error was not 
completely harmless, insofar as the record demonstrates that, with an opportunity to 
amend, Flynn could have pleaded a plausible claim of First Amendment retaliation 
against defendant Thomas Williams (a unit manager at SCI-Coal Township).7  
Second, we conclude that remand is appropriate with respect to the District 
Court’s decision granting summary judgment to Remaining Defendants on Flynn’s 
claims against defendants Stetler and Shipe concerning mistreatment in the “P.O.C. dry 
cell.”8 After the District Court ruled in favor of Stetler and Shipe on their affirmative 
defense of failure to exhaust institutional remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), two opinions issued which bear directly on the 
question of when such remedies are available to be exhausted. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. 
Ct. 1850 (2016); Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 
                                              
 
7 Williams and several other defendants were dismissed from the case because the 
District Court determined that Flynn failed to sufficiently allege their “personal 
involvement.” We have explained that a plaintiff raising claims under § 1983 “must 
demonstrate a defendant’s ‘personal involvement in the alleged wrongs,’” and that he 
does so “by describing the defendant’s participation in or actual knowledge of and 
acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 
222 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).  
 
8 We understand this claim to arise under the Eighth Amendment. 
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2016).9 The District Court should have the opportunity to consider in the first instance the 
applicability of Ross and Robinson in this case. 
For those reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment in part. We will 
otherwise affirm. The case will be remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the 
District Court should appoint counsel on Flynn’s behalf. Flynn is eligible for appointment 
of pro bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), and he satisfies the standard for such 
appointment under Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). See Powell v. Symons, 
680 F.3d 301, 308 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In Tabron, we held that, after considering the 
merits of a plaintiff’s claim as a threshold matter, a district court should consider 
additional factors that bear on the need for appointed counsel including: (1) plaintiff’s 
ability to present his case; (2) the difficulty of the legal issues; (3) the degree to which 
factual investigation will be necessary and plaintiff’s ability to pursue investigation; (4) 
plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his own behalf; (5) the extent to which the case 
will turn on credibility determinations; and (6) whether the case will require testimony 
from an expert witness.”).10 
A. 
Flynn was at all times proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. After Defendants 
filed their motion to partially dismiss the complaint, Flynn received extensions of time to 
                                              
 
9 The PLRA bars challenges to prison conditions, under § 1983, “until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
10 By order entered October 6, 2014, the District Court had denied Flynn’s motion for 
appointment of counsel. But it left open the possibility that it would reconsider that 
decision sua sponte “[i]n the event . . . that future proceedings demonstrate the need for 
counsel.” We conclude that a need for counsel has arisen. 
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respond. Instead of a formal opposition, Flynn filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment. Defendants challenged Flynn’s motion as premature. By order entered on 
August 26, 2013, the District Court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Flynn’s. 
In granting Defendants’ motion, the District Court dismissed with prejudice 
Flynn’s claims against 15 of the Defendants. Of particular relevance here, the District 
Court did not say in its opinion that all of the pleading deficiencies in Flynn’s complaint 
were incurable; in fact, neither the opinion nor the accompanying order said anything 
about the efficacy of an amended pleading at all. That was error.11 
District courts are to offer amendment in pro se civil rights cases unless doing so 
would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 
Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). That is so even when, as here, the plaintiff does 
not ask for leave to amend. See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. Furthermore, a district court 
should ordinarily identify the reason(s) behind any decision to withhold such leave. See 
Cureton v. NCAA, 252 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2001); cf. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 
182 (1962) (“[O]utright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason [i.e., 
inequity or futility] appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely 
abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.”).   
The District Court thus erred when it (1) failed to offer Flynn an opportunity to 
amend and (2) did not say why. Nevertheless, having considered Flynn’s complaint and 
the record as a whole, we are confident that this error was near-harmless. Cf. Lake v. 
                                              
 
11 Our standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2000).12 Only insofar as the District Court 
dismissed all claims against Williams was Flynn actually prejudiced by the absence of 
leave to amend. Our explanation follows.  
We first observe that Flynn’s claims against Williams were dismissed for want of 
pleaded personal involvement. Cf. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. The District Court noted that 
Williams was “clearly listed” as a defendant but, it accurately concluded, that there was 
“no other mention of [him] anywhere else in the Complaint.” Such a disconnect between 
a complaint’s caption and factual recitation may potentially be fixed through a pleading 
amendment. See, e.g., Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 298 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There 
are no allegations showing that Wendy Potts Fleegal or Sam M. Butler were personally 
involved . . . .  As a result, we conclude that the claims . . . against Wendy Potts Fleegal, 
and the claim . . . against Sam M. Butler, must be dismissed, with leave to amend.”) 
(emphasis added). But, again, a district court may refuse amendment if it is apparent that 
no viable claim against the seemingly stray defendant could be stated.  
                                              
 
12 The District Court properly concluded that the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, and the non-entity Defendants to the extent they were sued in their official 
capacities, all were immune from suit. Furthermore, it is apparent from Flynn’s complaint 
that several Defendants were sued in their individual capacities either because of their 
supervisory stature alone or because of their simple participation in grievance and 
disciplinary proceedings (which, to be sure, produced adverse results for Flynn and were 
derided by him as unfair). The District Court properly concluded that there is no § 1983 
liability under such theories. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330-31 (3d Cir. 
2016); Chavarriaga, supra, 806 F.3d at 222; Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 
1990). In addition, the District Court properly concluded that Flynn’s due process claims 
were defective as a matter of law. See Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (3d 
Cir. 2011); cf. Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 188-90 (3d Cir. 2015).  
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Here, we need not speculate about whether Flynn could have injected sufficient, 
plausible allegations of fact into his complaint to state a viable claim against Williams. 
Flynn’s motion for partial summary judgment—his de facto response to Defendants’ 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion—demonstrates that he was capable of doing so.13 
In the motion, Flynn argued that, in retaliation for his grievances related to “being 
systematically shut off by prison officials during [] pre-paid phone time,” Williams 
issued a report falsely stating that Flynn had pleaded guilty to certain charges of 
misconduct. Pursuant to the allegedly fabricated plea, Flynn was issued a misconduct 
(which became part of his prison record) and was sanctioned with a loss of phone 
privileges for a period of time. Flynn’s motion thus indicates that, had he been permitted 
leave to file an amended pleading, he could have adequately pleaded a prima facie case of 
First Amendment retaliation against Williams. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 
(3d Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that: (1) he engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct; (2) “he suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the hands of 
the prison officials”; and (3) “his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or 
motivating factor’ in the decision” to take that action) (citations omitted); cf. Wisniewski 
v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[C]omplaints to prison officials and 
                                              
13 Knox v. Secretary Department of Corrections, 669 Fed. App’x 611 (3d Cir. 2016), on 
which Defendants (now Appellees) rely in support of their harmless error pitch, see Defs. 
Br. at 12-13, is distinguishable. In Knox, a non-precedential opinion, we noted that “any 
error arising from the District Court’s failure to provide Knox an opportunity to amend 
was harmless” because if there were a way to make the claims viable Knox would have 
revealed it in his objections to the magistrate judge’s report. Id. at 612 n.3. Here, Flynn 
succeeded where Knox did not; a post-complaint, pre-dismissal filing by Flynn showed 
that one of his claims could be sufficiently fortified by a pleading amendment. 
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inmate requests implicate conduct protected by the First Amendment.”); Watson v. 
Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[a]n adverse consequence . . . 
need only be ‘more than de minimis’,” and finding that standard met where inmate “lost 
his radio . . . and the Class II misconduct became part of his prison record.”). To that 
extent, Flynn will be permitted to amend his pleading on remand.14 We will thus vacate 
the District Court’s judgment in part.   
B. 
 Flynn claimed in his complaint that he was unlawfully placed in the “P.O.C. dry 
cell for several days with no water, hygienic supplies, [or] clothing,” and was “denied 
medical attention when he was sick and vomited numerous times.” This claim, targeting 
the conduct of Stetler and Shipe, was the subject of Grievance No. 386960. The record 
reveals that this grievance was filed with the prison on October 22, 2011, was assigned a 
tracking number on October 26, 2011, and, according to the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections Inmate Grievance System Procedures Manual, should have been resolved 15 
working days later, i.e. by November 16, 2011. Flynn was informed that the prison 
obtained 10 extra working days to respond, making the new deadline December 1, 2011.  
It is undisputed that the prison’s eventual response was untimely; the facility 
manager (the adjudicator of Flynn’s first-level appeal) conceded that “even with a 10 
working-day extension the response [to Flynn’s grievance] was not prepared in a timely 
manner,” noting that sometimes “circumstances occur that are beyond the control of the 
                                              
14 We note that it is unclear from the record whether Flynn exhausted institutional 
remedies with respect to a retaliation claim against Williams.   
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institution.” Flynn’s first-level appeal was denied on the merits. The Secretary’s Office of 
Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA,” the final appellate adjudicator), however, 
dismissed Flynn’s appeal on procedural grounds.15 
In granting summary judgment to Remaining Defendants on Flynn’s claims 
asserting unlawful treatment in the “P.O.C. dry cell,” the District Court focused on 
Flynn’s procedurally defective SOIGA appeal. The District Court correctly observed that 
pre-suit exhaustion of available institutional remedies—required by the PLRA—must be 
pursued in accord with applicable prison regulations and policies. See Woodford v. Ngo, 
548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006). Flynn failed to do so with respect to his SOIGA appeal, the 
District Court determined, and thus failed to properly exhaust his claim prior to filing this 
action.  
 During the pendency of Flynn’s appeal of that determination, the Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Ross, supra, holding that there are “no limits on an inmate’s 
obligation to exhaust,” but that “[a] prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not 
‘available.’” 136 S. Ct. at 1855-56. Whether remedies are available to be exhausted by an 
inmate may turn on factual questions best resolved by district courts. See id. at 1862. 
Following Ross was our opinion in Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 
148 (3d Cir. 2016). There, we agreed with the inmate that the prison “rendered its 
administrative remedies unavailable to him when it failed to timely (by its own 
                                              
15 Defendants point out that Flynn’s SOIGA appeal was dismissed for three reasons: (1) 
his appeal to the facility manager was premature; (2) he “exceeded the two-page limit” 
for the narrative portion of his SOIGA appeal; and (3) he failed to submit to SOIGA a 
legible copy of his appeal to the facility manager. Defs. Br. at 15-16. 
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procedural rules) respond to his grievance and then repeatedly ignored his follow-up 
requests for a decision on his claim.” Id. at 154. In so concluding, we acknowledged that 
“[f]ive of our sister courts have held that a prison’s failure to timely respond to an 
inmate’s properly filed grievance renders its remedies ‘unavailable’ under the PLRA,” 
and that “[o]ur most relevant opinion is in line with these precedents.” Id. at 153-54 
(citing Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
In light of Ross and Robinson, both of which post-date the District Court’s 
exhaustion determination in Flynn’s case, we believe the best course of action is to 
remand for renewed consideration of the exhaustion issue. The District Court will be able 
to address the applicability of Ross and Robinson in the first instance, and sort out any 
factual questions that may arise—a task for which it is uniquely well positioned.   
C. 
We will affirm the judgment below in all other respects.  In particular, the District 
Court did not err in allowing defendants Stetler, Shipe, Lieutenant R.E. Long, 
Corrections Officer Nowell, and Superintendent David Varano to file a second motion for 
summary judgment. As a general matter, docket management is committed to the sound 
discretion of the district court. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d 
Cir. 1982). Thus, district courts have the authority to permit or restrict successive motions 
for summary judgment, see Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 68 (2d Cir. 2004), or to grant 
summary judgment sua sponte, see Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 
F.3d 199, 224 (3d Cir. 2009). Cf. Enlow v. Tishomingo Cnty., Miss., 962 F.2d 501, 507 
(5th Cir. 1992) (timing and sequence of motions, including successive summary 
13 
 
judgment motions, best lies at the district court’s discretion). Whatever the limits of the 
District Court’s considerable case-management discretion might be with respect to serial 
motions for summary judgment, those limits are not tested by the facts presented here. 
Cf. Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (observing that 
“allowing a party to file a second motion for summary judgment is logical, and it fosters 
the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ resolution of suits.”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). 
IV. 
To summarize our disposition: we will (1) vacate the District Court’s judgment in 
part, insofar as it dismissed all claims against Williams without giving Flynn an 
opportunity to amend; (2) vacate the District Court’s judgment in part, insofar as it 
granted summary judgment, on the basis of failure to exhaust institutional remedies, to 
Stetler and Shipe on Flynn’s claims regarding his time in the P.O.C. dry cell; (3) direct 
the District Court on remand to appoint counsel for Flynn, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); 
and (4) otherwise affirm the judgment.  
After counsel has been appointed, the District Court may wish to permit Flynn to 
file an amended complaint that does only the following: (1) re-pleads the same Eighth 
Amendment/P.O.C. dry cell claims against Stetler and Shipe that were advanced in the 
original complaint; and (2) alleges, consistent with the narrative set forth in Flynn’s 
February 2013 motion for partial summary judgment, that Williams retaliated against 
Flynn for his grievance activity in violation of the First Amendment. Regardless, the 
District Court should revisit its exhaustion ruling in light of Ross and Robinson with the 
aid of supplemental briefing. Among any other issues appointed counsel believes 
14 
 
appropriate to address at that time, counsel should address the timeliness question under 
Ross and Robinson and, more specifically, whether the prison rendered its inmate 
grievance system unavailable under Ross by violating or unreasonably applying its own 
procedures in denying Flynn’s final appeal. See Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-60.  
We note in closing that our decision should not be read to reflect an assessment of 
the merits of Flynn’s now-resurrected claims, nor should it be interpreted as rendering 
any opinion on those claims’ vulnerability to affirmative defenses that the relevant 
defendants may wish to raise at the appropriate time, insofar as those defenses are not 
inconsistent with our rulings in this appeal. In addition, we are not requiring that any 
amended complaint filed by Flynn be met with an answer rather than a dispositive 
motion; the District Court, as discussed above, has significant latitude when it comes to 
case management and is best situated to determine how to proceed after taking the steps 
outlined in this opinion. 
